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This study attempts to determine the extent to which human potential may be unlocked by government or 
other formal sector actions that induce voluntary contributions by individuals to the activities of 
Indonesia’s posyandus or village health posts. Posyandus have been an important feature of Indonesia’s 
public health system and have contributed substantially to the country’s success in lowering infant and 
child mortality rates at low cost.  
Our analysis of links between formal activity and voluntary contributions to posyandus is conducted at 
two levels: individuals and posyandus, and with two different indicators at each level. Our empirical 
results take advantage of data from all three waves of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), i.e., 
IFLS1, IFLS2 and IFLS3. At each level of analysis there is evidence that voluntary contributions and 
effective service provision can be positively affected by formal sector intervention. Both community level 
characteristics, such as income per capita, income inequality, ethnic and religious diversity, and 
household and individual characteristics have different effects on the different outcome variables at both 
levels of analysis. The results demonstrate that appropriately designed formal sector interventions can 
induce voluntary inputs and, through the public goods produced, they can unlock the human potential. 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which human potential may be 
unlocked by government or other formal sector contributions that serve to induce 
informal sector and voluntary contributions by individuals in such a way as to produce 
important local public goods. The nature of the study is motivated by the extreme 
scarcity of funding by government and external donors at present and in the foreseeable 
future in developing countries and the dearth of private providers of local public goods 
and services or even markets for such services. Given the rather dismal prospects for 
formal sector provision of local public goods, the informal sector is a potentially 
important vehicle for unlocking the human potential by producing appropriate kinds of 
public goods, especially health and education services. 
One important set of informal sector activities are those involving voluntary activities, 
such as time and money volunteered to various kinds of informal community 
associations. These associations are typically not ‘owned’ in any formal sense but only 
in a very loose sense by the collective membership of these associations. Often, the 
voluntary contributions of time, in-kind goods and services and money to these 
institutions by community members are the most important source of public goods 
production at the local level. This is especially so in developing countries where private 
markets for the various public goods are underdeveloped and where, because of their 
limited local tax base, local governments are extremely resource-constrained. 
Yet, both casual observation and the studies reported in the growing literature on local 
public goods production make it clear that the number and quality of activities provided 
by the same type of informal institution may vary considerably across countries and 
communities according to various community characteristics, such as its size, level of 
development, degree of income inequality, ethnic and religious diversity. Even more 
importantly, the magnitude and character of government or other formal sector 
participation in these associations, such as the government’s contribution of funds to 
their start-up, maintenance, management or choice of activities, may vary from one 
association to another both within and between communities.  
To accomplish the objective of this paper, we attempt to identify (1) the magnitude and 
direction of the effects of external interventions as well as those of various community, 
household and individual characteristics on the voluntary contributions of individuals to 
informal activities of the ‘unlocking human potential’ type, and (2) how the effective 
provision of human potential unlocking activities at the level of the local service 
provider is affected by different forms of external support and supervision as well as by 
a variety of community level characteristics.  
Such an analysis is used to help answer questions such as the following: (1) How do 
different forms of formal and external contributions affect the effective supply of 
voluntary activities and affect service provisions at the service provider level? (2) Do 
government contributions ‘crowd in’ or ‘crowd out’ voluntary contributions? (3) In 
what way and to what extent do these answers differ across different types of voluntary 
contributions? (4) To what extent and how are these effects modified by community 
level characteristics such as per capita income, the level of income inequality, and 
ethnic and religious diversity at the community level? (5) How do the characteristics of 
the individual (age, education, marital status) or of the household (income, household 
size) influence these voluntary outcomes?   2
Quite naturally, the answers to these questions have important policy implications. The 
benefits of private sector activities and the provision of government-supplied 
infrastructure and services for the well-being of different segments of the community 
will depend very considerably on the nature of the relationships identified above. If the 
provision of goods, services and employment by the formal sector merely substitutes for 
those provided by informal institutions, the net benefits may be much smaller than in 
the case in which the activities are in fact complementary. The knowledge of the 
character of these relationships and how they are affected by community and other 
characteristics may go a long way toward designing optimal mechanisms for ‘unlocking 
the human potential’ through these linkages.  
The study also provides implications for theory, especially that of behavioural 
economics, since voluntary contributions may well constitute ‘selfless’ or ‘altruistic’ 
behaviour, an important subject of investigation in both behavioural economics (Dawes 
and Thaler 1988, Mullainathan and Thaler 2000 and Rabin 1998) and Public Choice 
Theory. It also has very considerable relevance to the theory of local public goods.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 which follows provides a brief review of 
relevant literature on local public goods production and the role of informal activities. 
Section 3 defends the choice of both country (Indonesia) and informal service providers 
(posyandus) and describes the data set. Section 4 describes the methods. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. Section 6 derives implications for theory, policy and 
further research.  
2  Brief review of relevant literature 
The importance of local public goods as a means of facilitating investments in human 
capital and the establishment of firms is generally appreciated. Indeed, many of the 
basic needs of human beings and especially the basic services to develop human 
capabilities are supplied in the form of public goods at the local level (Sen 1985). Basic 
education, health, protection of person and property, the supply and maintenance of 
water supply, local streets and other infrastructure are in most countries supplied by the 
public or NGO sector at the local level.  
There is a large and growing literature on public goods in general and local public 
goods in particular. Basic contributions are those of Olson (1965) and Hardin (1968; 
1982). Although many of these local public goods are not pure public goods, and hence 
not fully jointly consumable and use non-excludable, they typically share these 
characteristics to some degree. This implies that their provision is inhibited by the 
incentive to ‘free-ride’. This of course undermines the efforts that local communities 
may make in providing the local public goods. Indeed, it is widely, though not 
universally, believed that, as a result, public goods production will be too low.  
Much of the literature has been devoted to identifying various characteristics of groups 
that may be advantageous in helping to overcome the free rider problem and hence the 
bias toward undersupply of public goods. Olson (1965) and Hardin (1982) for example 
argued that small size groups may be more successful than large ones, groups in which 
its members have been closely associated for long periods of time and/or share common 
backgrounds more successful than others, etc. The effects of some of these group   3
characteristics, however, are controversial. For example, Olson (1965) argued that 
income or wealth inequality might stimulate collective action whereas others like 
Bardhan (2000) have argued that it would weaken collective action. Similarly, some feel 
that ethnic or religious diversity would help the production of local public goods 
whereas others believe the opposite.  
To the extent that exclusion of non-contributors is possible, the incentive to free-ride 
may be weakened. Public goods in such situation are called ‘club goods’ and the 
underproduction problem controlled. Another tool for overcoming the incentive for 
free-riding is the practice of selective incentives, compensating people for their 
voluntary contributions in some way, perhaps with non-monetary rewards, or by 
assigning penalties to those who do not contribute. The extent to which people are 
desirous or in need of the public good can also be a factor. Those who would especially 
benefit from the public good for example would have greater incentive to contribute 
than others. Finally, if the group can be organized for some other purpose, for example 
in a democratic country by a ‘political entrepreneur’, this could greatly mitigate the 
problem.  
Because the effects of income inequality and ethnic and religious diversity have been 
especially controversial, much research has been devoted to these effects in recent 
years. Evidence provided by Alberto Alesina and various co-authors, especially Alesina 
et al. (1999) and Easterly and Levine (1997), show that some countries and regions 
within countries are considerably disadvantaged in the production of local public goods 
by virtue of considerable ethnic diversity. Strong evidence of the deleterious effects of 
income inequality on public goods production at the local level is provided for 
Indonesia by Swaminathan and Nugent (2003) and Nugent and Swaminathan (2004). 
This effect may be realized in several ways: (1) by making it more difficult to agree on 
the kind and quality of public goods to be produced and how to finance them, (2) by 
diverting expenditures away from development-related public goods toward incentive-
reducing redistributive transfers (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Persson and Tabellini 1992, 
1994). Since redistributive spending tends to be low in developing countries, 
mechanism (1) would seem more plausible. But even in this case, the exact reasons and 
underlying mechanisms are unclear. For example, is it the fact that the heterogeneous 
members have different tastes such that a compromise public good provides less 
satisfaction to all? Or is it that members of different groups within the community are 
altruistic within groups but not across groups? Or could it be that there is less public 
safety in more heterogeneous communities, making community members afraid to 
participate in community activities outside the home. Or could it be that it is less 
possible to impose sanctions (to mitigate the free-riding incentive) on those not 
contributing to the voluntary public good activities when these community members are 
from a different ethnic, religious or income group (Miguel and Gugerty 2002)? Even if 
answers to these questions can be obtained, how can these problems arising from 
heterogeneity be overcome (e.g., by forcibly relocating community members into 
homogeneous ones, by stressing integration into the national community, or by 
decentralizing institutions and their activities to the level of the income or ethnic group 
within the community?  
On the other hand, as indicated above, collective action theory can also lead us to 
believe that greater income inequality or ethnic diversity can have positive (rather than 
negative) effects on the supply of local public goods.    4
Another relevant literature for the determinants of voluntary activities and public goods 
production is that of behavioural economics. Thus far, most research in this field has 
been concentrated on developed countries. The fact that substantial percentages of the 
population in such countries have been engaged in voluntary activities has been taken to 
constitute prima facie evidence in support of the hypothesis of behavioural economics 
that behaviour is only boundedly selfish instead of purely selfish (Mullainathan and 
Thaler 2000). Yet, even so, time spent in such activities can be explained by 
considerations such as (1) tax laws discriminating against labour supply of secondary 
workers in the household (‘the marriage tax’), (2) the direct consumption utility derived 
from participatory community activities, and (3) the future potential commercial 
usefulness of the contacts developed in such work. Considerations (2) and (3) are 
especially plausible given that the rich and famous are often well-represented in such 
activities. Moreover, if one assumes that the utility of money income diminishes quite 
sharply at high levels, it may be very difficult to distinguish between purely and 
boundedly selfish behaviours.  
But, even in such a context, the existing literature alerts us to the fact that self-interest 
may be relevant in another form. For example, a woman may be more likely to 
volunteer time to the local school the more children of her own she has in the school or 
to the local health center the more that she anticipates the need of herself and her family 
members to use that facility. How much of observed volunteer activities can be 
attributed to these family self interest motives? How much to the relative importance of 
friends and acquaintances of the same ethnic or income group in the community among 
the users of such services for whom the volunteers may have some altruistic 
preferences?  
To what extent does visibility of participation make for greater participation in 
volunteering to community services and to what extent does the volunteering by some 
depend on the identities of others seen volunteering? Dawes and Thaler (1988), Rabin 
(1998) and other behavioural economists have suggested that people are more likely to 
volunteer when they see others with whom they share some ‘reciprocal altruism’ also 
volunteer. By comparing volunteerism and the patterns of such across members of the 
community in small villages with those in towns and cities we should be able to 
measure the importance of visibility. Since experimental evidence has often shown the 
importance of pre-game communication to cooperative outcomes such as the production 
of public goods, we also hope to distinguish the effect of actual selfless behaviour from 
the effect of communication on the likelihood and extent of mutual participation in 
voluntary community activities. 
Other factors that might explain voluntarism and in the process distinguish between 
bounded self-interest and reciprocal altruism are conditions in labour markets and 
income levels. If individuals were primarily motivated by the desire to earn income with 
voluntary labour supplies to the public service activities mainly derived as a residual, 
then we would expect a substitution effect between labour supply in the market and 
labour supply in voluntary activities. As a result, a higher market wage would result in 
greater time spent on market activities and less time spent on voluntary activities. On 
the other hand, if individuals set target income levels, as shown by Camerer et al. 
(1997), then a higher market wage might result in a higher labour supply to voluntary 
activities.    5
Yet another emerging theme in the behavioural economics literature is that ‘context 
effects’ are important (Camerer and Loewenstein 2003). Thus individuals would behave 
differently in contexts where spending time in voluntary public good activities is an 
option to market work than in contexts where voluntary labour supply is not an option.  
3  Choice of country, Posyandus and the Indonesian data set 
Indonesia is chosen as the country of study for several reasons, including its relatively 
low level of development, its economic and cultural diversity, and the diversity of its 
informal sector activities. To accomplish the aforementioned objectives and to answer 
the important questions posed above, very detailed data at the individual, household and 
community levels on formal and informal sector activities as well as on the numerous 
factors that have to be controlled for are required. Fortunately, such data is available and 
the study takes advantage of the three waves (one only recently released) of the 
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS 1, 2 and 3). Table 1 presents a description of the 
variables and variable names used in the analysis. 
One important feature of IFLS is the detailed information provided by the individual 
and household questionnaires concerning the time and money contributed voluntarily to 
each informal and formal sector activity by each of 19,800 individuals sampled from the 
321 communities. In each community, information was collected from a sample of 
health facilities – both formal and informal. Taken together also, the various 
questionnaires provide the information that can be used to control for community size, 
income inequality, ethnic diversity, employment opportunities, the level of development 
and government-supplied infrastructure. Another strength of the data is the extremely 
low rates of attrition of households from the initial sample in the subsequent rounds of 
the survey.  
For the informal sector whose determinants of voluntary activities are studied we 
choose ‘posyandus’ or impermanent integrated community health posts. The posyandus’ 
primarily provide health services to young children and family planning services to 
adults. These community health posts have been shown to have played a very important 
role in Indonesia’s public health strategy and in the substantial success that Indonesia 
has enjoyed in lowering its infant mortality rate and more generally raising the 
country’s health statistics and human development index. Posyandus typically operate 
in a community only about once a month and, while staffed by volunteers, can benefit 
from supervision and visits from trained staff (including physicians and midwives) from 
the government-run health centers (puskesmas) and family planning clinics. Financial 
support for posyandus comes from several sources including the village budget and 
local community members. In addition, a large part of the instruments and supplies used 
in the posyandus (such as weighing scales, vitamin pills) is provided by the health 
centers. The services provided by posyandus are based almost entirely on volunteers or 
very minimally remunerated cadres and make use of extremely low cost but effective 
instruments and materials. Organized at the community level by the Family Welfare 
Movement (PKK), Indonesia’s posyandus have won awards from both the World Health 
Organization and UNICEF for their success in volunteerism and health improvement.  
By the mid-1980s posyandus became a critical feature of Indonesia’s overall 
development and health improvement plans and, as a result, their presence spread   6
rapidly. From 20,000 in 1985, the number of posyandus increased to about 200,000 in 
1988 and became available in almost every village by the early 1990s. Especially given 
their voluntary character and the 1997-98 financial crisis, however, posyandus have had 
their ups and downs. Indeed, during the crisis the activity levels and quality of posyandu 
volunteerism and services deteriorated substantially. Table 3 shows that the proportion 
of women who participated in posyandus fell from 22 per cent in 1997 to 15 per cent in 
2000. It also shows some decline in the average number of cadres in posyandus over the 
1993 to 2000 period. Notably, there is also a sizable variance around the mean in any 
given year and it is this variability over time as well as over space that makes the 
posyandu experience over the three waves of IFLS, i.e., between 1993 and 2000, so 
useful for a study such as ours. The deterioration in the quality of the posyandus’ was 
sufficiently great in 1997-98 that in 1998 a Posyandu Revitalization Programme was 
initiated, but only in certain communities. Table 2 shows that about 50 per cent of the 
posyandus in 2000 were part of the revitalization programme. This revitalization 
comprised cadre training, improving the incentives of the cadres, and improving the 
quality of the instruments in the posyandus. Rather clear distinctions can be made 
between inputs supplied by government and other formal sector organizations (as in the 
Posyandu Revitalization Programme or some other means of external supply of funds, 
staff, supervision or material and equipment supply) and those contributed on a 
voluntary basis by individuals.  
In particular, for both 1993 and 1997 there is information at the level of the posyandu 
about inputs from both formal and informal sectors. For example, among the former are 
the frequency of the supervision of the posyandu by the formal health center 
(puskesmas). At the same time, for each posyandu, there is information on the quantity, 
quality and frequency of the services provided and the number of users. Finally, from 
the sampled adult women, there is information on both their participation and hours 
volunteered to the posyandus and the quality of services received by their children when 
visiting the posyandus.  
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the main independent variables used in the 
analysis. However, the statistics in Table 5 mask the degree of change over time within 
a given community. To take a closer look at these variations we present Figures 1A, 1B, 
and 1C. From the means presented in Table 5, it appears as if the number of posyandus 
in a community has not shown much variation over time. Figure 1C , however, dispels 
that notion. While some communities did not exhibit change (those along the 45-degree 
line) in the number of posyandus, there are quite a few that experienced either increases 
or decreases between 1997 and 2000. Similar variation is observed for two other 
‘formal’ interventions: the average number of instruments in the posyandu, and the 
number of visits per year from the family planning clinic to the posyandu. The 
dependent variables exhibit variation as well. While at the individual level participation 
in the posyandu has declined over time, at the posyandu level, the number of visitors 
has increased over time. This seems to suggest that while the extent of volunteerism 
shows a slight decline, the extent of utilization of the posyandu (possibly reflecting non-
voluntary behaviour) has increased over time.   7
4 Methods 
The goal in this paper is to estimate the effect of formal interventions on participation 
in, and the quality of, involuntary institutions. To achieve this goal, we estimate models 
at two different levels: At the posyandu level, we estimate the determinants of two 
outcomes: (i) the number of cadres, and (ii) the number of visitors. At the individual 
level, we estimate the determinants of another two outcomes: (iii) participation of 
individual women in the posyandu as users of posyandu services, and (iv) the quality of 
the posyandu as measured by the care individual children received. The formal 
intervention variables used include supervision of posyandu activities by the staff of the 
puskesmas, funding of the posyandu from the village budget, the posyandu 
revitalization programme, and other variables such as education, income, and income 
inequality. The description of covariates used in the models is presented in Table 1.  
For outcomes (i), (ii) and (iii) above, we estimate two specifications that vary in the way 
the effect of formal intervention is identified. The general specification can be written 
as: 
01 2 jtj t j t j j t yI n t e r v e n X v ββ β δ =+ + ++ (1) 
In this model (j) indexes observation (either individual or posyandu), and (t) indexes 
time. The first specification is the random effects model that uses cross-sectional and 
longitudinal variation in jt Interven  to identify 2 β . The second specification is the fixed 
effects model that uses only variation in jt Interven over time to identify the model. The 
advantage of the fixed effects model is that it eliminates any bias caused by correlation 
between  jt Interven and j δ . This correlation might exist, for example, if formal 
interventions are more likely in areas where individuals have a lower propensity to 
participate in community activities. When the unit of observation is the posyandu, we 
cannot introduce fixed effects at the posyandu level but do so at the community level. 
This is because posyandus are, by their very nature informal institutions, and hence 
cannot be linked over time. Introducing community level fixed effects in the posyandu 
level model allows us to identify 2 β using both longitudinal and cross-sectional variation 
in  jt Interven among posyandus’ within a community.  
Our final model (iv) estimates the effect of formal intervention on the quality of 
healthcare provided to a child visiting the posyandu. Since comparable data is not 
available in the earlier waves of IFLS, to estimate this model we use data only from 
Wave 3 (2000). This model provides an estimate of the effect of formal intervention on 
the probability of receiving specific kinds of healthcare in the posyandu, namely, 
vitamin A pills, an immunization, and an oral rehydration solution for treating diarrhea.  
The model estimated here is: 
12                              (2) ij j i j i ij qI n t e r v e nX u γγ =+ +  
where  ij q indicates whether service of type (j) has been provided to child (i), i Interven is 
the formal intervention, and X are other controls. The problem in unbiased estimation of 
equation (2) is that q is not observed for children that have not visited the posyandu in   8
the four weeks prior to the survey. If those children that have visited the posyandu are a 
non-random subset of the entire sample of children, the estimates in equation (1) might 
be biased. To account for this potential non-random selection, we also jointly estimate 
the selection equation: 
,  missing 1 2                              (2') i not i i i qZ X v αα =+ +  
The correlation in the error terms in equations (2) and (2') is identified using the 
instruments in the vector  i Z that includes variables such as the number of posyandus’ in 
the community, household income, etc. Table 1 lists the covariates used in both the 
service (2) and selection (2') equations. For each type of service, equations (2) and (2') 
are estimated by maximum likelihood allowing for correlation in the error terms 
 and  uv . 
5  Empirical results  
The results for volunteerism at the individual level are presented in Table 4. We 
estimate models for two different measures of posyandu participation, namely the 
decision to participate or not (DmPART) and the number of hours devoted to posyandu 
activities (HOURS). Since the former is a binary variable, it is estimated by Probit. 
Since the latter is continuous but bounded below at zero, it is estimated by Tobit.  
Table 3 presents the results for both DmPART and HOURS. The asterisks next to the 
parameter estimates reflect the level of significance (*, **, and *** reflecting levels of 
10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively). Beginning with the characteristics of the individual 
woman, schooling has positive effects on both variables of voluntary activity in 
posyandus. Age has a non-linear effect (positive up to a point but then declining); being 
married and having children less than five years of age have very significant positive 
effects on both. At the household level, income per capita has negative and significant 
effects, and speaking the same language as the majority in the community has a positive 
but not significant effect (except in the case of fixed effects in which case the effect on 
dmPART is negative and significant at the 10 per cent level). At the community level, 
both language diversity and average per capita income have negative and significant 
effects on both measures of participation in posyandus. As to the intervention variables, 
the average number of instruments in each posyandu (TINST), the number of annual 
visits from staff of the National Family Planning Board (FPLANV) and the number of 
posyandus in the community all have positive and significant effects on both dmPART 
and HOURS. Urban location, visits of puskesmas staff to the posyandus and the total 
number of activities in the community have no significant influences on either measure 
of voluntary participation in posyundu activities. 
The strength of the age and other demographic effects shows that voluntary 
participation by Indonesian women in the informal posyandu sector is very much a life 
cycle phenomenon, and very much triggered by marriage and having small children. 
This can also be interpreted as relative need for the services that posyandus provide, 
suggesting that such volunteerism is by no means selfless in nature. The fact that both 
household and community level per capita income have negative effects on posyandu 
participation is indicative that the institution of posyandus is one that caters primarily to 
poor people. It might also imply that individuals’ with better labour market prospects   9
(and hence higher household income) are less inclined to participate in the voluntary 
activity. The positive effect of inequality in per capita income can be interpreted in a 
similar way since, for any given per capita income at the community level, greater 
inequality would imply a relatively larger proportion of poor people in the community. 
As suggested in the local public goods literature, ethnic diversity (reflected in language) 
has a negative influence on participation in voluntary activities for posyandus.  
As far as the effect of formal sector activities on participation, there are several pieces 
of evidence that these effects are positive. Education is a formal sector activity that has 
positive and significant effects on both measures of participation. Likewise, the 
following measures of formal sector contribution to and supervision of posyandu 
activities: AVGTINST, AVGFPVIS and NUMBPOS, all have positive and significant 
effects on voluntary activities by individuals to posyandus.  To provide a better sense of 
the magnitude of these effects we simulated the effect of a change in specified 
covariates when value of the other covariates was fixed at their means. Doing so, we 
find that increasing the number of visits of staff from the family planning clinic from 
once every four months to once every month will increase the probability of 
participating in the posyandu by about 2 percentage points. Relative to the mean 
participation probability of about 0.18, this represents a slightly higher than 10 per cent 
increase. Further, increasing the education level of women from a primary (six years) to 
junior high (10 years) increases the probability of participation by 2 percentage points.  
Next, we turn to the results at the posyandu level given in Table 5. In this case, we use 
the number of cadres in a posyandu (CADRES) as a measure of volunteerism and then 
the total number of visits to posyandus (VISITS) during the last three months as a 
measure of client participation, reflecting in part the quality of services offered by the 
posyandu. The CADRES measure is clearly more closely related to the volunteer 
participation at the individual level in Table 4 than is VISITS. Similar to the results at 
the individual level, schooling and the inequality of per capita income both have 
positive and significant effects on CADRES. By the same token, YPC has a negative 
effect (though in this case it is not statistically different from zero). Of special interest, 
however, are the positive and significant effects of the posyandu getting funds from the 
village budget and the number of instruments that the posyandu has (TINST). Since 
these are clearly both measures of perceived formal sector support to posyandu 
activities, these results suggest once again that volunteer activities can be induced by 
formal sector contributions. Note also that these effects are just as strong in the fixed 
effects estimates as in the random effects ones. The number of instruments in the 
posyandu is a significant determinant of the number of cadres. Simulation results show 
that starting with covariate values at their respective means, increasing the number of 
instruments in the posyandu from 3 to 6 increases the number of cadres by about 10 per 
cent.  
From the results for VISITS given in the last two columns of the table, one can again 
see the positive effect of instruments (TINST). Having a posyandu revitalization 
programme (POSYREVIT) also has a positive and significant influence. VISITS is 
presumably a measure that reflects the quality and deemed usefulness of posyandu 
services. Note that in this case YPC at the community level has a significant positive 
effect and the inequality in YPC a highly significant negative effect. The latter finding 
is consistent with our aforementioned earlier results (also for Indonesia and based on the 
same data sets) showing that inequality was found to have a significant negative effect 
on health care utilization and educational investments at the individual level. Average   10
schooling levels in this case have a negative and significant effect, possibly reflecting 
the fact that those communities with more education on average would be expected to 
have more formal sector sources of health service provision than would those with 
lower schooling levels. Simulation results reveal that increasing the posyandu’s number 
of instruments from 3 to 6 increases the number of visitors by about 10 per cent while 
posyandus with revitalization had on average about 140 more visitors than posyandus 
without revitalization. 
While VISITS may be a reasonable proxy for quality of posyandu service provision on 
the grounds that if the community members did not find the services valuable they 
would not make the visits, it is certainly a rather blunt measure. Clearly, the connection 
to service quality and health outcomes is at best only suggestive. In the final step of our 
analysis we go on treat the visit to a posyandu (VISITPOS) as a selection equation (to 
test for the possibility of selection bias) and then attempt to explain variations in the 
delivery of each of the three specific services mentioned above – labelled VITAMIN, 
IMMUN and ORALR, respectively – to these individuals. Once again, we introduce 
controls for various individual, household and community characteristics but place 
special emphasis on the effects of formal sector contributions. The formal sector 
interventions examined are: (a) the presence at the time of delivery of the service of a 
staff member from the (formal sector) ‘puskesmas’ or public health clinic 
(PUSKSTAFF), (b) whether or not the posyandu received any funding from the village 
budget (VILFUND), and (c) whether or not the posyandu had a Posyandu Revitalization 
Programme (POSYREVIT). Since both the VISITPOS and each of the three service 
provision variables are (0, 1) dummy variables, in each case the parameters of the 
jointly estimated selection and service equations are probit estimates. The results are 
presented in Table 6. 
Turning first to the results for VITAMIN, we find that both VILFUND and 
POSYREVIT have positive effects on the probability that vitamin pills are provided 
when a child visits the posyandu. Of even greater relevance is the positive and 
significant coefficient of PUSKSTAFF in the probit equation for VITAMIN. The 
selection equation (VISITPOS) results reveal no evidence of gender bias 
(CHILDMALE) but a very strong negative influence of CHILDAGE, positive effects of 
the number of posyandus in the community (NUMPOS) (a measure of proximity) and 
the income inequality measure GINIYPC. The fact that household income has a 
negative effect further supports our explanation for our interpretation that the posyandu 
is an informal sector institution primarily serving the poor. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the correlation in the error terms in the service and selection equations is 
zero.  
The second set of results in the table is that for ORALR. Quite naturally, the results for 
the selection equation (VISITPOS) are virtually identical to those found in the selection 
equation for VITAMIN. Once again, the effect on the formal sector contribution 
measure PUSKSTAFF is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. None of the 
other determinants have statistically significant influences on ORALR. There is also 
evidence that those more likely to visit the posyandu are also more likely to receive Oral 
Rehydration Solution (correlation between u and v is positive).  
Finally, we discuss the results for immunization (IMMUN). Once again, we find that 
having health center staff present at the time of the posyandu visit increases the 
likelihood of the child getting immunized. Not surprisingly, older children are less   11
likely to be immunized when they visit the posyandu. None of the other formal sector 
variables affect the probability of immunization. The presence of a staff member from 
the puskesmas (health center) is significantly associated with provision of all three 
services. We simulate the effect of a presence of a staff member on the probability of 
service provision conditional on the child visiting the posyandu. We find that the 
conditional probability of the child receiving vitamin pills increases from 0.72 to 0.79 
when the staff member is present. Similarly, we find that the conditional probability of 
receiving ORS increases from 0.13 to 0.37 when a staff member is present. Finally, the 
conditional probability of getting immunized increases from 0.03 to 0.08 when the staff 
member is present.  
6 Conclusions 
What kinds of implications can be drawn from this analysis for both theory and policy? 
First, from the descriptive statistics we saw there has been considerable voluntary 
participation in informal activity by Indonesian women even though there has been a 
decline over the period 1997-2000. To a large extent, posyandu participation and hours 
of time provided are dictated by life cycle and demographic factors. Those who are 
married with young children are much more likely to participate than other women 
(younger and older without young children). This would suggest that much of the 
voluntarism in local public goods production is partly motivated by self interest in that 
the women who participate are those most likely to need the services provided by 
posyandus. Since use is negatively related to income both at the household and 
community levels and positively related to income inequality at the community level, 
we interpret this as an indication that the primary beneficiaries and those most in need 
of these services are relatively poor people who cannot easily afford other alternatives.  
Since the services produced by the posyandus are quasi-public goods, our results also 
have implications for the theory of collective action in general and local public goods in 
particular. Of particular relevance are the effects of income inequality and ethnic or 
religious diversity. Ethnic diversity was shown to have a negative effect on voluntary 
participation in posyandus while at the same time the individual speaking the same 
language at home as the majority in the village has a positive but not significant effect. 
On the other hand, per capita income inequality exerts negative effects only in the case 
of quality-related measures of posyandu activities as reflected in the number of visitors 
to the posyandu. Inequality, on the other hand is positively related with participation in 
informal activities. This finding, though a bit surprising, is perhaps because income 
inequality is picking up elements of community level poverty since a higher gini 
coefficient might also imply more poor people in the community. It might also be that 
income inequality is very imprecisely measured. Substantial components of income, 
especially those from self-employment are not reported in the data. Future work will 
consider other options such as merging in district level inequality measures constructed 
using data from National Household Surveys (SUSENAS). 
Finally, given our focus on the relevance of formal sector contributions and support for 
informal sector activity, the most important findings are the positive effects of several of 
the indicators of formal sector support for posyandus. The validity of our estimates is 
bolstered by the fact that in both random and fixed effects specifications, several formal 
interventions are significantly related to volunteer participation and service provision in   12
the posyandu. The fixed effects results allow us to generate more ‘causal’ conclusions. 
An increase in the number of instruments at the posyandu or the number of visits from 
staff from the family planning clinic increases the probability that a woman will 
participate in the posyandu. Similarly, increasing the education levels also leads to 
higher participation. At the posyandu level, 140 more visits were observed to those 
posyandus that underwent a revitalization programme in 1998-1999 compared to those 
posyandus’ that did not. Taken as a whole, these results suggest a significant role for the 
formal sector in inducing participation in posyandu activities, and improving the quality 
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YRSSCHOOL (Education level of women in 
years)  x       x 
AGE (age of woman)  x        x 
AGE squared  x        x 
Gini of YPC (community level gini of income)  x      x  x 
DmMARRIED (married dummy)  x        x 
KIDS0-5 (# kids between 0-5 years)  x        x 
URBAN (urban dummy)  x  x  x    x 
DIVLANG (diversity in language )  x  x  x    x 
dmMJRLNG (dummy: own language is 
majority)  x       x 
YPC (total household income)  x  x  x    x 
CmYPC (mean community income)  x  x  x  x  x 
CmPOP (population in community- in 1997)    x  x     
CmYRSSCHOOL (avg. educ. level in 
community)   x  x     
AVGTINST (avg. no. of instruments per 
posyandu)  x       x 
AVGPUSKV (avg. no. of annual puskesmas 
visits)  x       x 
AVGFPVIS (avg. no. of annual family planning 
visits)  x       x 
NUMBPOS (no. of Posyandus in community)  x        x 
NUMBPUSK (no. of Puskesmas in 
community)  x       x 
PUSKFUND (Posyandu funding from 
Puskesmas)   x  x     
VILBUD (Posyandu funding from village 
budget)   x  x     
TINST (no. of instruments in Posyandu)    x  x     
POSYREVIT (Posyandu revitalization)    x  x     
PUSKSTAFF(staff from Puskesmas when 
child visit)       x   
CHILDAGE (age of child)        x   
FRAC_VILBUD (fraction of Posyandus 
funding from village budget)       x   
FRAC_POSREVIT (fraction of Posyandus 
revitalized)       x   
 
Note: x’s indicate that the variable was used in the model while blanks indicate the variable was not used.   15
Table 2 
Longitudinal and cross-sectional variation in important covariates and dependent variables 
 1993  1997  2000 
Community level       
 FRAC_VILBUD  0.35  0.39  0.31 




























Posyandu Level       
 VILBUD  0.35  0.38  0.31 






 POSREVIT  0  0  0.48 
 PUSKSTAFF  x  x  0.81 
Other covariates used in analysis       
 YRSSCHOOL      6.28  
(4.35) 
 AGE      37  
(16) 
 DmMARRIED      0.64 
 KIDS0-5      1.29  
(0.56) 
 URBAN      0.53 
 CHILDAGE      7.23 
 (4.36) 
 CHILDMALE      0.50 
 YPC      1172762 
(1575827) 




(1) x’s in the table represents non-availability for that variable-year combination. 
(2) Standard deviations in parenthesis for continuous variables, but are not reported for discrete 
variables.   16
Table 3 
Variation in the dependent variables 
Dependent variables  1993  1997  2000  Model  Estimation 
Participation in 
posyandu by women 
x 0.22  0.15  Logit:  random 
and 
conditional 
fixed effects  
Maximum 
likelihood 
Annual hours involved 


















fixed effects  
Maximum 
likelihood 
Total number of 
visitors in three 












Child received service 
at posyandu: vitamin A 
pill 







Child received service 
at posyandu: oral 
rehydration solution 







Child received service 
at posyandu: 
Immunization 







Child visited posyandu 
in four weeks prior to 
survey 
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Table 4 
Participation in and hours supplied to Posyandu by women 
Participation (DmPART)    Hours  Explanatory variable 
Random effects  Fixed effects   Random effects
YRSSCHOOL 0.0620***  0.1551***    0.8039*** 
AGE 0.0657***  0.1354***    0.6171*** 
AGE squared  -0.0018***  -0.0025***    -0.0173*** 
Gini of YPC  0.3283  0.8420*    6.1452* 
DmMARRIED 2.0998***  1.9158***    23.799*** 
KIDS0-5 0.7840***  0.3453**    8.2226*** 
URBAN -0.0304  -    -0.4073 
DIVLANG -0.5044***  -0.4491    -4.5829** 
dmMJRLNG 0.0730  -0.2861*    1.5829 
YPC -0.0001***  -0.0001**    -0.0010*** 
CmYPC -0.0005***  -0.0006***    -0.0047*** 
AVGTINST   0.0199*  0.0358*    0.2581* 
AVGPUSKV 0.0052  0.0057    0.0237 
AVGFPVIS 0.0199***  0.0222**    0.1077 
NUMBPOS 0.0314***  0.0542*    0.3762*** 
NUMBPUSK 0.0003  0.0032    -0.0859 
CONSTANT -4.2559***  -    -54.5386*** 
Log likelihood   -6780  -1771    -19611 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient indicated is statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 
10 per cent levels, respectively.   18
Table 5 
Posyandu level participation by volunteers (cadres) and clients 
Number of cadres in Posyandu Total number of visits to Posyandu 
during last three months 
Explanatory variable 
Random 
effects  Fixed effects  Random 
effects  Fixed effects 
Health center funding  0.0235  0.0365  7.3773  2.1995 
Village budget funding  0.0472*  0.0661**  -8.5307  -0.9272 
TINST 0.0188***  0.0151***  4.774***  3.5060** 
POSYREVIT 0.0200  0.0193  140.1894***  143.9775*** 
GiniYPC 0.5514***  0.6200***  -277.1782***  -320.3041*** 
CmYPC (in millions of 
rupiah) 
-0.003 -0.0054 0.0045***  0.0059*** 
CmYRSSCHOOL   0.0289***  -0.0239  -4.8472**  -21.7575*** 
CmPOP 0.0044***  -  0.0013***  - 
URBAN 0.1634***  0.0586  21.3402*  -2.5055 
Log likelihood  -4341   -3237  -  - 
Within group R2  -  -  0.20  0.22 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient indicated is statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 
10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Provision of services at Posyandu (child level model) 
 VITAMIN  ORALR  IMMUN 
Service provision to child       
 PUSKSTAFF  0.24**  0.73***  0.34*** 
 CHILDAGE  0.21***  0.008  -0.42*** 
 FRAC_VILFUND  0.18*  -0.06  0.11 
 FRAC_POSREVIT  0.19**  -0.03  -0.09 
  Gini of YPC  -0.17  0.33  -0.08 
Selection equation       
 YRSSCHOOL  0.005  0.006  0.01* 
 AGE  -0.007  -0.006  -0.008 
 AGE  squared  0.00007  0.00005  0.00001 
  Gini of YPC  0.48*  0.53*  0.61* 
 DmMARRIED  -0.10  -0.09  -0.08 
 KIDS0-5  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02 
 URBAN  0.15**  0.17***  0.22*** 
 DIVLANG  -0.48***  -0.48***  -0.40*** 
 dmMJRLNG  0.07  0.07  0.09 
  YPC (in millions of rupiah) -0.03  -0.04*  -0.01 
  CmYPC (in millions of rupiah)  -0.14**  -0.15***  -0.17*** 
 AVG_TINST    -0.03**  -0.03**  -0.025** 
 AVG_PUSKV  -0.013**  -0.015** -0.017*** 
 AVG_FPLANV    0.004  0.001  0.001 
 NUMBPOS  0.03***  0.03***  0.027*** 
 NUMBPUSK  0.01  0.01  0.014** 
 CHILDMALE  0.018  0.008  0.016 
 CHILDAGE  -0.37***  -0.36***  -0.37*** 
 Rho  (u,v)  -0.36  0.41*  0.80*** 
 N  1055  1055  1055 
 Log  likelihood  -2484  -2149  -2435 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient indicated is statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 
10 per cent levels, respectively.   20
 
Figure 1A 
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Figure 1C 
Variation in the number of Posyandus 
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